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ABSTRACT
I present a new puzzle that concerns Aristotle’s accidents. This puzzle arises when 
applying a basic requirement of accidentality to the variety of cases Aristotle provides. 
In short, Aristotle seems to offer, now the thought that a is accidental to b, and now 
that b is accidental to a; but if accidentality is asymmetric, as it seems to be, then a’s 
being accidental to b implies that b is not accidental to a. One might offer a schooled 
Aristotelian solution, allowing that while a is in a sense accidental to b, b is accidental to 
a in a quite different sense. But, as I will argue, this solution does not work, for there are 
cases in which a and b are accidental to each other in the same sense. Ultimately, the 
solution to the new puzzle relies not on distinguishing between senses of ‘accident,’ but 
rather on unearthing a new feature of accidentality: accidentality is contextual, in a sense 
to be defined in the paper.
TYLER HUISMANN 





The thought that some properties are more metaphysically significant to their bearers than others is 
traceable back to Aristotle. His concept of what belongs ‘in itself’ — that is, what belongs essentially 
or intrinsically — plays an important role in his ontology.1 So too does the corresponding notion of 
belonging ‘incidentally’ — that is, what belongs accidentally, what is an accident — for as Aristotle 
held, what belongs intrinsically cannot alone fully capture the grain of what there is; to fill in the 
details, accidents are required. To be sure, the metaphysical significance of essential properties 
explains the fact that philosophers today focus on them rather than accidental properties, and 
why scholarly work on Aristotle’s ontology focuses on what belongs intrinsically rather than what 
belongs accidentally. But Aristotle himself did not isolate the two branches of this distinction in 
that way. For one, he attributed to some accidental properties the same modal profile enjoyed 
by intrinsic properties; for another, he held that some things that belong intrinsically are also 
accidental properties. So what Aristotle says about what belongs intrinsically is intertwined with 
his account of accidents.
This paper focuses on that account. In particular, I argue that there is an unappreciated puzzle 
therein, one that has implications for both what it takes to belong accidentally and what it takes 
to belong intrinsically. That seeming inconsistencies would manifest in Aristotle’s discussion of 
accidents is, of course, hardly surprising: that some accidents have the same modal profile as 
intrinsic properties and that some accidents also belong intrinsically are notoriously difficult to 
explain.2 For Aristotle sometimes seems to hold that some accidents are necessary features, 
just as intrinsic properties are (Top. 102b4-7); at other times, he seems to say that accidents are 
merely contingent features, that accidents are only what both can belong and can fail to belong 
to something (Met. 1025a30-34). Another puzzle arises when Aristotle seems to say now that 
being an accidental feature is incompatible with being an intrinsic one (APo. 73a34-b5), now that 
there are such things as intrinsic accidents (τὰ�  καθ’ αὑ�τὰ�  συμβεβηκότα) (APo. 75b1). Typically, these 
issues are resolved by distinguishing among senses of ‘accident’; indeed, Aristotle admits that the 
word is polysemous in Metaphysics 5.30 [1025a14-34], and scholars put this admission to good 
use in resolving just these problems.3 The result is a framework in which only some accidents 
belong contingently, with others belonging necessarily; and in which only some accidents belong 
intrinsically, with others failing to do so. 
A puzzle of a similar sort manifests when considering what is accidental to what in physical 
contexts, cases of accidentality that arise in causal interactions. And just as explaining the older 
puzzles sheds light on accidentality in Aristotle, resolving the new puzzle does as well. The previous 
puzzles concern accidentality having some feature or other — is accidentality compatible with 
necessity, is it compatible with intrinsicality? — and in this regard, the new puzzle is no different: 
given the cases we will see below, how can accidentality be asymmetric? For that it is asymmetric 
is widely appreciated.4 But we will see that Aristotle seems to offer, now the thought that a is an 
1 I use ‘intrinsic’ as a translation of καθ’ αὑ� τὸ�  throughout, though others prefer ‘essential.’ One reason in favor 
of ‘intrinsic’ is Aristotle’s use of τὰ�  καθ’ αὑ� τὰ�  συμβεβηκότα in Posterior Analytics and elsewhere. Rendering καθ’ αὑ� τὸ�  
with ‘essential’ would translate τὰ�  καθ’ αὑ� τὰ�  συμβεβηκότα as ‘the essential accidents.’ If one takes ‘essential’ and 
‘accidental’ to be incompatible predicates, this translation makes a mess of Aristotle’s thought. But we can avoid this 
issue by rendering of καθ’ αὑ� τὸ�  with ‘intrinsic,’ which is a perfectly acceptable translation of καθ’ αὑ� τὸ� ; and ‘intrinsic 
accidents’ does not have the ring of contradiction.
2 See, among others, Barnes (1993), Ebert (1998), Graham (1975), Granger (1981), Smith (1997), Tierney (2001), 
and Wedin (1973).
3 See, e.g., Smith (1997) and Tierney (2001).
4 On this asymmetry, Lewis writes that ‘it [that is, the relation ‘x is an accident of y’] is irreflexive but asymmetric 
[…]’ (Lewis 1991: 105). Additionally, Studtmann says that ‘All other entities bear some sort of asymmetric ontological 
relation to primary substances. For example, all accidents inhere in primary substances while primary substances 
do not inhere in anything (Cat. 1a20–1b8)’ (Studtmann 2012: 71). See also Corkum, who says generally that ‘the 
asymmetry between substances and non-substances is well recognized’ (2008: 70n6). For all that, care must be 
taken in assessing claims of asymmetry, since oftentimes the relation scholars are analyzing is dependence, which 
may be a relation distinct from accidentality. For instance, Wedin explains that ‘The asymmetry between substance 
and accident rests on the fundamental fact that the world contains two kinds of individuals that stand in a relation 
of one-way ontological dependence’ (Wedin 2000: 86). So for Wedin, ontological dependence is asymmetric, 
and accidents are ontologically dependent on substances; but there is no explicit avowal of the asymmetry of 
accidentality. (Cohen (2009: 198) and Loux (2008: 47n66) are additional such examples.) It is, of course, a brisk 
inference from (i) accidents are just items accidental to what they are dependent on and (ii) dependence being 
asymmetric to (iii) accidentality being asymmetric. To be sure, accidentality is just that relation in virtue of which we 




accident of b — or, equivalently, that a is accidental to b — now that b is accidental to a, and it 
is not immediately obvious how to square these. Here, one might take the same approach that 
resolved the other puzzles, reading Aristotle as holding that, while a is an accident of b, b is an 
accident of a in a quite different sense. But this brings us to the crucial difference between the new 
puzzle and the old ones: as I will argue, this solution does not work, for there are cases in which a 
and b are accidental to each other in the same sense. Ultimately, the solution to the new puzzle 
relies not on distinguishing between senses of ‘accident,’ but rather on unearthing a new feature 
of accidentality: accidentality is contextual, in a sense to be defined below.
The plan of the paper follows the above sketch of the new puzzle. I begin by going through a 
number of examples in which one thing is said to be accidental to another, focusing especially 
on causal examples that involve accidentality (§1). I then turn to the evidence that accidentality 
is asymmetric, namely a passage from Metaphysics 4.4 (§2). Finally, I conclude by presenting 
the new puzzle and considering two candidates for solving it (§3). I argue that distinguishing 
among senses of ‘accidental’ fails to solve the new puzzle, but attributing to Aristotle the idea 
that accidentality is contextual does solve it. With this solution in hand, we will have a better 
understanding both what belongs accidentally to some bearer and what belongs intrinsically to 
some bearer.
§1: A VARIETY OF CASES
It is safe to say that Aristotle uses ‘accidental’ (κατὰ�  συμββ ηκὸ�ς) and ‘accident’ (συμβεβηκὸ�ς) to 
denote something relational.5 Accidents are always accidents of something, whatever modal 
profile they might have or explanatory work they might do (or fail to do). Perhaps the best-
known example of accidents in this regard are qualities, quantities, and generally whatever fall 
into categories outside the category of substance: such items are accidental to substances.6 The 
quality pale, say, is accidental to Socrates, just as 6’ tall is accidental to Callias.7 Now, it will turn 
out that more items than those from non-substance categories are accidents of something, so it 
will be helpful, at this point, to introduce some fresh terminology. I will call items that fall under 
non-substance categories — that is, items that are qualities, quantities, relatives, and so on — 
attributes. Put as such, Aristotle’s best-known examples of accidentality are attributes that are 
accidental to substances. One need only reflect on the ease with which we refer to attributes 
simply as ‘accidents’ to see this.
To be sure, attributes are examples of accidents of something. But we must take care not to 
conclude that, for Aristotle, only attributes are accidents of something. He says nothing to preclude 
‘is an accident of something’ from holding of a substance, and in fact gives us an example of this 
sort in Metaphysics 5.2. He there develops a number of causal distinctions, and in the course of 
doing so gives the following example of an accidental cause of some effect and that effect’s 
correlative intrinsic cause:
[T1] Further, there are accidental causes and their kinds — for example, of a statue, 
in one way Polyclitus, in another a sculptor, because it is accidental to the sculptor 
to be Polyclitus (ὸ�τι συμβέβηκε τῷ ὰ� νδριαντοποιῷ Πολυκλείτῳ εἶ�ναι). (Metaphysics 5.2 
[1013b34-1014a1]; trans. Reeve, modified.) 
Aristotle here says that it is an accident that the sculptor is Polyclitus, which is to say that the sculptor 
and Polyclitus stand in an accidentality relation. Now, which is accidental to which depends on 
Aristotle’s general account of accidental causation. According to the standard model, a can be an 
accidental cause of b in two ways: by being an accident of an intrinsic cause (καθ’ αὑ�τὸ�  αἶ�τιον) of 
5 For Aristotle’s use of ‘accidental’, see Metaphysics 4.4 [1007a35]; for his use of ‘accident’, see Physics 1.3 
[186a34-b17].
6 See, e.g., Ackrill (1963), 147–148; Lewis (1985), 59; Loux (2012), 375; Studtmann (2012), 71; Wedin (2000), 
38–66.
7 There is some debate as to whether Aristotle holds items such as pale and 6’ tall to be universals or particulars; 




b; or by being an intrinsic cause of what b is an accident of.8 Now, the case Aristotle describes in 
[T1] is one in which something is an accidental cause in the first way: Polyclitus is an accidental 
cause of a statue produced by a sculptor because Polyclitus is accidental to the sculptor. Just as the 
quality pale is an accident of Socrates when he’s pale, so too is Polyclitus an accident of an intrinsic 
cause, the sculptor — indeed, Aristotle holds that it’s because Polyclitus is an accident of the sculptor 
that Polyclitus is an accidental cause. Now, Polyclitus is a substance, and no substance is a quality, 
quantity, or any other attribute.9 And generally, when a is an accident of b, a need not be a attribute.
In addition to [T1], we find Aristotle committed to ‘is an accident of something’ holding of another 
non-attribute in Metaphysics. The opening chapter of Metaphysics 7 describes the relationship 
between a substance and an accidental unity as one where the latter is an accident of the former. 
But before examining that passage, I need to say a word about accidental unities. Throughout, 
I write as if, for Aristotle, accidental unities are different compounds than substances, as if 
accidental unities comprise substances and attributes.10 There is, however, disagreement over this, 
with some attributing to Aristotle the thought that accidental unities are identical to substances.11 
Those who take this view likely would prefer to explain what is an accident of what in a manner 
different from my exposition. Still, I do not intend to engage in this debate here. My aim in this 
paper is to show that accidentality has a philosophically significant feature, and as I argue below, 
this consequence follows whether or not accidental unities are identical to substances.
As the opening of Metaphysics 7.1 illustrates, accidental unities are accidents of something, giving 
us further reason to think that, when a is an accident of b, a need not be an attribute:
[T2] Other things are said to be by being either quantities of what is in this way [i.e. by 
being quantities of substances], or qualities, or affections, or something else of this 
sort. That is why one might indeed be puzzled as to whether walking and recovering and 
sitting do signify each of these things as beings, and similarly for any other thing of this 
sort; for none of them either is of a nature to be in its own right, or is capable of being 
separated from substance. If anything, it is the walking one and the seated one and the 
recovering one that is. These things are clearly more real, because there is some definite 
thing that underlies them (τὸ�  ὑ�ποκείμενον) — namely the substance and the particular 
— which is apparent in such a predication; for one cannot speak of the good one or 
the seated one apart from this. Evidently, then, it is on account of this, i.e. substance, 
that each of those is also; and therefore what primarily is — not is something but is 
without qualification — will be substance. (Metaphysics 7.1 [1028a18-31]; trans. Bostock, 
modified; my emphasis.)
Admittedly, [T2] does not explicitly invoke the relationship of accidentality. Still, we can see that 
the passage’s reference to a ‘the thing that underlies them’ (τὸ�  ὑ�ποκείμενον) commits Aristotle to 
an accidental unity being accidental to its underlying substance when we consider the following. 
The walking thing, the sitting thing, and the healthy one are, in this context, accidental unities, 
substances taken together with certain qualities. They are not themselves qualities, for they are 
more real than the qualities of walking, sitting, and recovering. And neither are they substances, for 
substances underlie the walking thing, the sitting thing, and the one being healthy. In this case, a 
substance’s underlying the walking one entails that the latter is an accident of the former, a sense 
Aristotle gives to ‘underlying’ elsewhere in Metaphysics 7:
Now, about two of these we have already spoken, namely, about the essence and 
the underlying subject, and said that it underlies in two ways, either by being a this 
something (as the animal underlies its attributes) or as the matter underlies the 
actuality. (Metaphysics 7.13 [1038b3-6]; trans. Reeve.)
8 This is the standard model that interpreters rely on in explaining accidental causation; see, e.g., Allen (2015, 
76–77), Freeland (1991), and Judson (1991, 78–79).
9 On the referent of a proper name being a substance, see Metaphysics 5.6 [1015b20-23].
10 I therefore follow Brower (2010), Cohen (2008), Hennig (2017), Lewis (1991), Matthews (1990), and Peramatzis 
(2011).




When a substance underlies, say, the sitting thing, either this relation is the same relation as 
that between an animal and its attributes — its various qualities, quantities, and so on — or it is 
the same relation as that between matter and the actuality (Reeve, 2016: 438). Presumably ‘the 
actuality’ is here to be understood as actual form that, having combined with the matter, yields a 
compound substance. I.e., the latter possibility is one where matter underlies a form; e.g., Socrates’ 
flesh and bones underlies Socrates’ human soul. But this is not the relation between an accidental 
unity and the substance that partly comprises it. For if it were, the walking thing would be related 
to the substance underlying it as Socrates’ soul is related to his flesh and bones; but Socrates’ 
soul and his flesh and bones comprise a substance, unlike the walking thing and its underlying 
substance. Thus the relation between the sitting thing and the substance that underlies it is the 
kind of relation that obtains between an animal and its attributes. Which is to say, the sitting thing 
is an accident of some substance. Here is another example, then, of a being an accident of b and 
a not being an attribute; rather, a is an accidental unity. We must not get into the habit of thinking 
that a’s being an accident of b entails that a is a attribute — hence my reluctance simply to call 
attributes ‘accidents.’
ITEMS THAT ACCIDENTS ARE ACCIDENTS OF
Nor does a’s being an accident of b entail that b is a substance. In [T1], Polyclitus is an accident of 
the sculptor. Now, to those who include accidental unities in Aristotle’s ontology, the sculptor is in 
all likelihood an accidental unity comprising a human being and the art of sculpting. Indeed, that 
experts generally are accidental unities seems clear enough from Aristotle’s scattered remarks on 
the topic. One of his preferred examples of an expert is a house-builder, and he is explicit that the 
art of house-building, and arts in general, are specific kinds of qualities, namely states.12 Because 
states are a kind of quality, there are no states that exist separate from some substance; the 
nature of the relationship between humans and the art of house-building being one of possession 
in Metaphysics 9.8 [1050a10-12]. For there to be arts at all, there must be humans that possess 
them, and this entails the existence of an accidental unity in which a human is conjoined to the 
art. Generally, then, experts are accidental unities.
When Aristotle says, in [T1], that Polyclitus is an accident of the sculptor, this is therefore a case of 
a substance being an accident of an accidental unity. There are additional examples in Aristotle’s 
corpus of something being an accident of an accidental unity. For instance, he describes a case 
where a house-builder is an accident of a doctor as follows:
[T3] And it is an accident that the house-builder heals someone, because a doctor 
naturally makes it, not a house-builder, but the house-builder was an accident of a 
doctor; and a confectioner, aiming to give pleasure, might produce health in somebody, 
but not according to the art of confectionary — and so, it was an accident, we say, and 
in a way he produces [health], but not simply (Metaphysics 6.2 [1026b37-1027a5]; trans. 
Kirwan, modified.)
Aristotle again uses an example of efficient causation to illustrate accidental causation, since doctors 
naturally (πέφυκε) efficiently cause health. Now, the house-builder and the doctor are both experts 
— both have a characteristic art, the art of medicine for doctors, the art of house-building for house-
builders — and in this example it seems that the same human being possesses both of those arts. 
The house-builder and the doctor are, then, accidental unities of one and the same human being 
and the corresponding arts. And so, when Aristotle relates the house-builder and the doctor using 
a variant of ‘is accidental’ (συμβαίνω), he takes one accidental unity to be an accident of another.
In addition to accidental unities being accidental to each other, it seems that some attributes are 
accidents of accidental unities:
[T4] That which is may be so called either accidentally or in its own right: accidentally, 
as for instance we assert someone just to be cultured, and a man cultured, and 
someone cultured a man; in much the same way as we say that someone cultured 




builds, because cultured is accidental to a housebuilder or a housebuilder to someone 
cultured (for ‘that this is this’ signifies ‘this is accidental to this’). (Metaphysics 5.7 
[1017a7-13]; trans. Kirwan.)
Here, we are told the quality cultured is an accident of a house-builder, and so, we have another 
case of something being an accident of an accidental unity. So not only are some items accidental 
to substances, some items are also accidental to accidental unities. 
The texts examined in this section, and specifically these lines from Metaphysics 5.7, invite the 
following sort of concern. Aristotle holds that some predications, while true, are not metaphysically 
perspicuous and are not parts of any demonstration; he dubs such predications accidental 
predications in Posterior Analytics 1.22.13 His example there concerns a substance (a log) and a 
quality (pale), the latter of which is accidental to the former. In this case, both ‘the log is pale’ and 
‘the pale one (ββ ββββββ) is a log’ are true. However, Aristotle has it that the grammatical structure of the 
latter conceals that the pallor in question is accidental to the log; the grammatical structure of 
the former does no such thing. And so, ‘the pale one is a log’ is true, but its truth condition is not 
the log’s being accidental to the quality pale, rather it is the quality pale’s being accidental to the 
log. Generally, the grammatical subjects of accidental predications do not denote substances, so 
one might look for instance to 1017a10 in [T4], and wonder if the truth conditions for ‘the cultured 
one builds’ require a nuanced approach, in the way that the truth conditions of ‘the pale one is a 
log’ do. But even if ‘the cultured one builds’ is an accidental predication in virtue of its grammatical 
subject denoting a non-substance, there is no difficulty in understanding the truth conditions for 
what we find at 1017a10, because Aristotle gives those conditions at 1017a11: ‘the cultured one 
builds’ is true because the quality cultured is accidental to a house-builder. And even though the 
texts I am relying on often have a grammatical subject that denotes a non-substance, so too are 
their truth conditions clearly laid out. So even if accidental predication abounds in these passages, 
Aristotle’s use of ‘is accidental’ (συμβαίνω) in them precisifies what, exactly, is accidental to what.
I summarize the examples of accidentality that Aristotle provides in the following table. The 
entities listed in the left column are what fill the left-hand argument place in ‘a is accidental to 
b,’ and the entities listed in the top row are what fill the right-hand argument place. I leave blank 
pairs of entities which fall outside the scope of this paper:
In the next section, I explain why Aristotle denies that attributes are accidental to other attributes. 
As for the other possible combinations, I leave them aside because I do not know of examples that 
clearly fall into these categories. But even in leaving them aside, there is a certain variety evinced 
by the cases in the table, which jointly show that there are more lines of accidentality than might 
be thought at first glance. Just as attributes are accidental to substances, so too are accidental 
unities, and even substances themselves, identified as accidents of something. So there are more 
entities that are accidents than just attributes, and when we appreciate this fact, the identification 
of a substance as an accident of something in [T1], or of one accidental unity being an accident of 
another in [T3], is not peculiar at all. Rather, these texts fit into an account of the accidental that 
is as fine-grained as Aristotle holds the world itself to be.
§2: UNCOVERING ASYMMETRY
The examples of accidents in causal situations that Aristotle offers reveal that there is more to 
accidentality than attributes being accidental to substances. However, you might reasonably offer 
13 The account of accidental predication offered in the main text follows Barnes’; see Barnes (1993, 176).
Rab; a is accidental to b Substance (b) Accidental Unity (b) Attribute (b)
Substance (a) Y
Accidental Unity (a) Y Y




the following worry at this point. Even if you agree that the correct set of possible relata for the 
relation denoted by ‘is an accident of’ is that of substances, attributes, and accidental unities, some 
of the cases above seem to stand in direct opposition to better-known facts about accidentality. 
First and foremost in this regard is that Aristotle takes ‘is an accident of’ to denote an asymmetric 
relation, and above, the asymmetry seemed to be fixed by the type of entity at stake. Substances 
are ontologically prior to attributes, so when Socrates and the quality pale are accidental to each 
other, the latter is accidental to the former and the former is not accidental to the latter. But it’s 
difficult to see how this line of thought would run in [T3], where the house-builder is accidental 
to the doctor, because the entities are of the same type: the doctor and the house-builder are 
both accidental unities, so neither is ontologically prior to the other, and the type of entity at 
stake does not, in this case, fix what is accidental to what. It’s also hard to see how [T1] and [T2] 
fit together: if, according to considerations of type, accidental unities are accidents of substances 
and accidentality is asymmetric, then substances should not be accidents of accidental unities; or, 
if substances are accidents of accidental unities, and accidentality is asymmetric, then accidental 
unities should not be accidents of substances. So one might think that, on the basis of [T2], 
because the sculptor is an accidental unity and Polyclitus is a substance, the former is accidental 
to the latter. But if accidentality is asymmetric, then Polyclitus is not accidental to the sculptor, in 
direct opposition to what Aristotle says in [T1].
Addressing these issues is the business of this section. To do so, I turn to the evidence for 
accidentality being asymmetric. The principal reason for attributing this idea to Aristotle 
is an argument from Metaphysics 4.4. To be sure, the conclusion of that argument is not that 
accidentality is asymmetric. Rather, his argument there crucially presupposes the thought that 
accidentality is asymmetric, for it would be obviously invalid without it. And so, it is reasonable to 
read the argument as containing a commitment to the asymmetry of accidentality. 
The broader context of the argument is as follows. Aristotle considers an opponent who claims 
that whenever something holds of something else, the former is an accident of the latter. This 
position undermines Aristotle’s claim that some features hold intrinsically, and so it is no surprise 
that Aristotle offers a reductio of the opponent’s position: Aristotle says that, if everything that 
holds of something is an accident of that something, it follows an accident will be accidental to an 
accident. But this cannot be the case:
[T5] Not even more than two combine; for the accidental is not accidental to the 
accidental, unless because both are accidental to the same thing — I mean for instance 
that pale may be cultured and the latter pale because both are accidents of a man. But 
Socrates is not cultured in that way, that both are accidental to some other thing. […] 
Nor indeed will there be any other thing accidental to pale, e.g. cultured, for there is no 
more reason (οὑ�θέν μᾶλλον) that the latter is an accident of the former than the former 
of the latter. (Metaphysics 4.4 [1007b1-13]; trans. Kirwan, modified.) 
The accidental is not accidental to the accidental, and what this means in our terminology is that 
no attribute is accidental to an attribute. Of course, two attributes, pale and cultured say, might 
be accidents of the same substance, and Aristotle even seems to say that cultured is accidental 
to pale when he adds to his original restriction the rider ‘unless because both are accidental to the 
same thing.’ What exactly this rider means, and what exactly the sense of [T5] is, is difficult. Kirwan, 
for instance, takes the rider to amount to a concession on Aristotle’s part that one attribute can be 
accidental to another, an allowance that ‘mutual coincidence of a and b is possible’ (Kirwan, 1993: 
218). But the rider cannot mean that, when the two attributes mentioned in [T5] are accidental to 
Socrates, cultured is accidental to pale: Aristotle denies this very state of affairs at the end of [T5], 
saying that nothing, not even cultured, is accidental to pale. We therefore cannot understand the 
rider as a concession that cultured is accidental to pale, without saddling him with inconsistency. 
And to be sure, Aristotle explains the rider by saying, not that pale is accidental to cultured when 
the two qualities are accidental to the same human, but simply that pale is cultured; and he 
concludes [T5] by saying that nothing, not even cultured, is accidental to pale. It is for these 
reasons, then, that I disagree with Kirwan’s reading, and resist interpretations according to which 




Rather, the key to understanding the rider lies in the example Aristotle uses to explain it: in the 
first sentence of [T5], Aristotle holds that, when the two attributes are accidental to Socrates, the 
accidental predication ‘pale is cultured’ is true. Now, the truth of that sentence does not entail that 
one attribute is accidental to another — after all, the sentence contains no form of ‘is accidental’ 
(συμβαίνω) — but we might suspect it does have this entailment because of its grammatical 
structure. For when Socrates is pale and cultured, ‘pale is cultured’ and ‘Socrates is cultured’ are both 
true and have the same predicate term. But, as Aristotle emphasizes, cultured is only accidental 
to Socrates, not to pale. In short, the rider ‘unless because both are accidental to the same thing’ 
explains the truth conditions for the accidental predication ‘pale is cultured;’ it does not allow that 
cultured is accidental to pale. The reason that one cannot be accidental to the other, the reason 
that ‘is an accident of’ denotes an asymmetric relation, comes in the final sentence of this passage.
In rendering that sentence ‘there is no more reason that the latter is accidental to the former than 
the former to the latter,’ I identify it as an indifference premiss, a premiss of the form ‘there is no 
more reason for p than for q’. An argument containing such a premiss is a specific type of Principle 
of Sufficient Reason argument, namely an indifference argument.14 Usually, though not always, 
indifference premisses are expressed by coordinating two terms, ‘no’ (οὐ) and ‘more’ (μᾶλλον).15 
Given his expression ‘no more than’ (οὑ�θέν μᾶλλον) in the final sentence of [T5], we see that this 
passage is an instance of Aristotle using this kind of reasoning. And taking him to do so makes 
good sense of the overall argument, for Aristotle’s reliance on indifference arguments shows fairly 
clearly what he thinks follows from an indifference premiss: according to him, if there is no more 
reason for p than for q, then either both p and q or neither p nor q.16
If we read the argument of [T5] as an indifference argument, then the sense of the passage 
becomes simpler to grasp. There is no more reason for pale to be an accident of cultured than 
for cultured to be an accident of pale. So either each is an accident of the other, or neither is an 
accident of the other. Now, Aristotle clearly concludes that neither is an accident of the other, so he 
must presuppose that each being accidental to the other cannot be the case. Without that crucial 
presupposition, the argument in [T5] is invalid. And so, pale is not an accident of cultured, nor is the 
latter an accident of the former. Finally, the argument is supposed to support the more general 
claim that the accidental is not accidental to the accidental, so it must be that this example is 
suitably arbitrary and that the facts of this particular case generalize: if there is no more reason 
for a to be accidental to b than for b to be accidental to a, then neither is accidental to the other.17
Now, the presupposition that is required for Aristotle’s argument to go through is the denial of 
pale and cultured both being accidental to the other; it is a matter of course to show that this is 
equivalent to the thought that if one is accidental to the other, then latter is not accidental to the 
former. And this is just asymmetry. Of course, this presupposition coheres with the indifference 
argument in [T5]: in cases where something is accidental to something else, it follows that there 
will be some reason that a is accidental to b instead of b being accidental to a. If there were no 
reason for b’s not being an accident of a, then the indifference argument of [T5] would block a’s 
being an accident of b in the first place. But again, this is just asymmetry: when something is 
accidental to something else, there’s a reason the latter is not also accidental to the former. 
ACCIDENTALITY OR ACCIDENTAL SAMENESS?
The argument of [T5] contains, then, Aristotle’s commitment to the asymmetry of accidentality, 
and we can see exactly why he needs this claim: without it, his argument that the accidental 
14 On indifference reasoning both generally and in ancient philosophy, Makin (1993) is impeccable.
15 For this reason, some simply call indifference arguments ‘ou mallon arguments.’ See McCabe (1995: 278).
16 See Physics 4.8 [215a22-24] and On Generation and Corruption 1.7 [323b3-21], as well as Makin’s remarks on 
these passages (1993: 105–122).
17 Given that we have seen, in §1, cases in which one accidental unity is accidental to another, it must be that, in 
such cases, there is a reason for one to be accidental to the other while the latter is not accidental to the former. (It 
is for this reason that I understand ‘the accidental is not accidental to the accidental’ in [T5] as the thought that 
attributes are not accidental to attributes.) I discuss this more in §3, but for now I will simply say that the reason an 




is not accidental to the accidental does not go through. But at this point, I need to consider an 
alternative possibility for the relation that the entities in [T1] – [T4] stand in. I am arguing that 
those entities are accidental to one another, but it is possible that they stand in an altogether 
different relation: it is possible that they are merely accidentally the same (ταὑ�τὰ�  κατὰ�  συμβεβηκός). 
Aristotle describes accidental sameness in Metaphysics 5.9 [1017b27-30], and the relation is 
typically understood to be a symmetric relation between substances and accidental unities.18 
(Items that are accidentally the same are sometimes called ‘accidental sames.’) In many of our 
examples, the entities involved stand in relations of accidentality and accidental sameness, and 
so, we need to keep in mind the fact that the items Aristotle mentions in the passages above 
stand in both an asymmetric relation and a symmetric one. Of course, the fact that accidental 
sameness is symmetric is perfectly compatible with accidentality’s being asymmetric. A mundane 
example of relations exhibiting the same logical features might help, for instance, fatherhood 
and being a biological relative: Aristotle is the father of Nicomachus and is a biological relative of 
Nicomachus; and, of course, being a biological relative is a symmetric relation. And these two facts 
do nothing to undermine the asymmetry of Aristotle’s being the father of Nicomachus, just as the 
fact that the items mentioned previously are accidental sames does not undermine the fact that 
one is asymmetrically accidental to another. Still, if the most that could be said of the passages 
considered below is that the items Aristotle speaks of are accidental sames, then there would be 
no puzzling violation of asymmetry. It will be good, then, to reconsider the passages discussed in 
the previous section, to confirm that they are cases where the asymmetry requirement latent in 
[T5] holds good, and not merely cases where two things are accidentally the same and therefore 
need not stand in an asymmetric relation.
Let me start by saying that Aristotle’s expression ‘things accidentally the same’ (ταὑ�τὰ�  κατὰ�  
συμβεβηκός) does not appear in any of the texts considered in §1; nor does his word for same 
things (ταὑ�τὰ� ) appear on its own. Nor still does accidental sameness hold between entities in 
all of our examples: accidental sames are typically thought to be pairs consisting in exactly 
one substance and exactly one accidental unity; Lewis, who provides the standard account of 
accidental sameness, has it that ‘x is accidentally the same as y if and only if (i) exactly one of x 
and y is a substance and exactly one is an accidental compound’ (1991: 103) But neither [T3] nor 
[T4] fit this condition. This absence is not decisive, of course, but I take it to suggest that Aristotle 
is, more likely than not, bringing forward cases in which one thing is accidental to another, and not 
merely cases where two things are accidentally the same.
This suspicion is confirmed when we consider the end of the argument of [T5]. Aristotle says there 
that one attribute cannot be accidental to another, where Aristotle marks out this relation with 
the verb ‘is accidental’ (συμβέβηκεν). That is, he marks out the relation with the construction he 
uses in [T1], where he uses the verb ‘is accidental’ (συμβέβηκε) to describe the relation between 
the sculptor and Polyclitus. Because both constructions are perfect tense forms of the same verb 
(συμβαίνω), I take it that they mark out the same relation. But this is hardly a surprise, given that 
Aristotle’s concern in [T1] is elucidation of a case of accidental causation, a phenomenon that, 
according to the standard model, manifests when something is accidental to an intrinsic cause; 
the intrinsic cause in the particular case is the sculptor, the accidental cause Polyclitus, so Aristotle 
there takes Polyclitus to be accidental to the sculptor.
One might yet resist this reading along the following lines. [T1] describes the relation between 
Polyclitus and the sculptor using a complementary infinitive: ‘it is accidental (συμβέβηκεν) to the 
sculptor to be (εἶ�ναι) Polyclitus.’ However, [T5] explains the requirement without such an infinitive, 
saying that, when a and b are attributes, it is not the case that a is accidental (συμβέβηκεν) to b. 
It may be, then, that Polyclitus and the sculptor are not subject to the requirement set down in 
[T5]; perhaps they are merely accidental sames. Similarly, in [T4], Aristotle does not merely say 
that ‘cultured is accidental (συμβέβηκε) to the house-builder;’ rather, he says ‘it is accidental to 
the house-builder to be cultured’ (συμβέβηκε τῷ οἶ�κοδόμῳ μουσικῷ εἶ�ναι). Could not Aristotle use 
such constructions when marking out mere accidental sameness, with the result that there is no 
puzzling violation of the asymmetry of accidentality?




I do not deny that Polyclitus and the sculptor are accidentally the same; indeed, because one is 
accidental to the other, one is a substance, and the other an accidental unity, I am committed to 
this pair being a pair of accidental sames. But the difference in syntax between [T1] on the one 
hand, and [T5] on the other hand, does not imply that the entities mentioned in [T1] are merely 
accidentally the same. Nor are the entities in [T4] of the right kind for accidental sameness to 
manifest. In fact, [T4] shows that accidentality is the relation under the microscope in each of 
these passages: for Aristotle explains there that he is considering cases of one thing being another 
(τόδε εἶ�ναι τόδε) where one thing is accidental to another (συμβεβηκέναι τῷδε τόδε). That is, when 
he there says that it is accidental to the house-builder to be cultured, this signifies that the quality 
cultured is accidental to the house-builder. And on balance, I take Aristotle’s explanation of what it 
means for it to be accidental to this to be that, in conjunction with his use of the same verbs in [T1], 
[T4], and [T5], to show that it is more plausible that the relations he speaks of in these passages 
are instances of accidentality; rather than his word order suggesting that we supply a missing 
‘same’ (ταὑ�τὸ� ) and understanding the relations merely as instances of accidental sameness.
The asymmetry requirement in [T5] applies, then, to the relation between the sculptor and 
Polyclitus as it is outlined in [T1]: in that passage, Polyclitus is accidental to the sculptor. To be sure, 
the two are, additionally, accidentally the same, and Polyclitus’ being accidentally the same as 
the sculptor is perfectly compatible with the sculptor’s being accidentally the same as Polyclitus. 
But even though the two stand in a symmetric relation, they also stand in an asymmetric one, 
just as Aristotle and Nicomachus stand in a symmetric relation (denoted by ‘is a biological relative 
of’) and an asymmetric one (denoted by ‘is a father of’). Aristotle similarly holds, in [T4], that the 
quality cultured is accidental both to a house-builder and to a man, and he does so using forms 
of ‘is accidental’ in the perfect tense (συμβέβηκε and συμβεβηκέναι). It must be that the same 
relation is at stake in both [T4] and [T5]. The asymmetry requirement of [T5] therefore applies to 
both of these cases: the quality cultured is accidental to a house-builder and the house-builder 
is not accidental to cultured; and cultured is accidental to a man, and the man is not accidental 
to cultured. Again, these entities are also accidentally the same, but the fact that accidental 
sameness is symmetrical is perfectly compatible with the asymmetry of accidentality.
Finally, in [T3], Aristotle takes the builder to be accidental to a doctor, using the verb ‘is accidental’ 
(συνέβη) to mark out the relation between the two. This construction differs from what we find 
in [T5]: where the requirement that no attribute be accidental to another is expressed in perfect 
tense forms of ‘is accidental’ (συμβαίνω) the relation between the builder and doctor is expressed 
with an aorist form. One might reasonably wonder if the fact that the construction he uses an 
aorist form in [T3] indicates a relation different from that of accidentality. However, accidental 
sameness does not manifest between two accidental unities; and what is more, Aristotle’s use 
of aorist forms of ‘is accidental’ elsewhere suggests that these too mark out when one thing 
is accidental to another. Recall, in Physics 2.5 [196b27-29], he says that accidental causation is 
ubiquitous, that an effect has many accidental causes, and the way he expresses this is relevant 
for our purposes. Again, according to the standard model, all of the accidents that belong to a 
are accidental causes of whatever a intrinsically causes. Now, a given effect has many accidental 
causes, and Aristotle says that this fact is explained by the fact that many things may be related 
to something, presumably the intrinsic cause of the effect in question. The relation between them 
is marked out by συμβαίη, an aorist construction form of συμβαίνω. But this must mean that the 
many things are accidental to the intrinsic cause of the effect in question, for it is only in this way 
that the effect will have many accidental causes. It follows, then, that in each case considered in 
the previous section, one item is asymmetrically accidental to another. 
§3: THE NEW PUZZLE
The cases described in §1 should satisfy the asymmetry requirement outlined in §2, and it will 
be good to start working out how they might do so. Start with an example of an attribute being 
accidental to a substance, pale being an accident of Socrates. If pale is an accident of Socrates, 
there must be a reason why Socrates is not an accident of pale. In this particular case, the reason is 




of pale. But this explanation also holds for similar cases: generally, substances are ontologically 
prior to attributes, and this prevents substances from being accidents of attributes. And so, both in 
the specific case of pale being an accident of Socrates, and generally in the case of attributes being 
accidents of substances, there is an asymmetry between what is accidental to what.
Similar reasons explain examples where an attribute is accidental to an accidental unity and 
an accidental unity is accidental to a substance. One instance of the former is outlined in the 
Metaphysics 5.7 passage above, where cultured is accidental to the house-builder. If this is the 
case, then there should be a reason that the house-builder is not accidental to cultured. The 
reason, just as in the case of Socrates and pale, has to do with ontological priority. In [T2], Aristotle 
says that the seated one is ‘more real’ than seated, by which he likely means the seated one is 
ontologically prior to seated.19 And we should expect this result, for the seated one is an accidental 
unity comprising a human substance and a quality. Which is to say, part of the seated one is 
a substance, whereas no part of seated is a substance. There is a reason, then, that cultured is 
accidental to the house-builder though the house-builder is not accidental to that quality: the 
house-builder is ontologically prior to cultured. Similarly, if the seated one is accidental to Socrates, 
the reason that Socrates is not accidental to the seated one is that Socrates is ontologically prior 
to the seated one. In short, attributes being accidental to substances, attributes being accidental 
to accidental unities, and accidental unities being accidental to substances easily satisfy the 
asymmetry requirement: in these cases, a is an accident of b and the reasons that b is not an 
accident of a are readily available.
The other examples of accidentality require a different approach. One example of a substance’s 
being accidental to an accidental unity that we saw above is Polyclitus’ being an accident of the 
sculptor. Now, Polyclitus is ontologically prior to the sculptor, and if we simply apply reasoning 
based on ontological priority to this instance of case, the sculptor would be an accident of Polyclitus 
and Polyclitus would not be an accident of the sculptor. But this result is in direct opposition to 
what Aristotle says in [T1], where he tells us that Polyclitus is an accident of the sculptor. But 
nothing forces us to deploy ontological priority to understand [T1] — indeed, it better had not, for 
if we use ontological priority to explain [T1] we get the direction of the relation backwards, since 
Aristotle says there that Polyclitus is accidental to the sculptor. In fact the context of the passage 
suggests an altogether different concept for explaining why Polyclitus is an accident of the sculptor 
and not the other way around: recall, [T1] tells us that the sculptor is an intrinsic efficient cause 
of statues, but Polyclitus is not. What I propose here is that, just as a being accidental to b relative 
to ontological priority prevents b being accidental to a relative to that same priority, so too does a 
being accidental to b relative to intrinsic causation prevents b being accidental to a relative to such 
causation. And so, the fact that Polyclitus is accidental to the sculptor relative to intrinsic efficient 
causation prevents the sculptor — an accidental unity — from being an accident of Polyclitus 
relative to such causation. So the reason that the sculptor is not an accident of Polyclitus relies not 
on ontological priority, but on intrinsic efficient causation.
Again, if ontological priority is all we think is available to Aristotle for explaining asymmetry, 
examples of one accidental unity being accidental to another are not obviously asymmetric. The 
doctor is not ontologically prior to the house-builder, nor is the house-builder prior to the doctor, 
so if the house-builder is accidental to the doctor, why would the doctor fail to be accidental to 
the house-builder? Again, we can explain the asymmetry between the two causally: as Aristotle 
says in [T3], it is characteristic of the doctor, and not the house-builder, to heal. That is, the doctor 
is an intrinsic efficient cause of health and the house-builder is not; and just as being an intrinsic 
efficient cause of statues prevents the sculptor from being an accident of Polyclitus, so too does 
being an intrinsic efficient cause of health prevent the doctor from being an accident of the house-
builder.
Taken individually, each of the cases listed at the end of §1 seems to abide by the constraint laid 
out in §2, namely that when a is an accident of b, there is a reason that b is not an accident of a. 
19 Metaphysics 7.3 [1029a5-7]: ‘if the form is prior to, that is, more real than, the matter, it will also be prior to the 




However, a moment’s thought reveals that this first pass account leads to a puzzle. Polyclitus is as 
much of a human substance as Socrates is, while the sculptor is an accidental unity and therefore 
not a substance. So while reflection on the asymmetry requirement might help to explain the case 
of Polyclitus’ being an accident of the sculptor in isolation, the following question still remains: is 
Polyclitus an accident of the sculptor, or is the sculptor an accident of Polyclitus? There is a causal 
reason to think that Polyclitus is an accident of the sculptor, and an ontological reason to think 
that the sculptor is an accident of Polyclitus. But it cannot be that both are accidents of each other, 
for that state of affairs is ruled out by the asymmetry of accidentality. So which is it?
FALSE STARTS
The puzzle of explaining how Aristotle’s examples of accidents jointly satisfy the asymmetry 
requirement is what I am calling the new puzzle about Aristotelian accidents. And in a way, the 
new puzzle is more difficult to solve than the older puzzles, for it is not susceptible to the general 
strategy that resolves the older ones so well. That strategy consists in distinguishing between 
senses of ‘is an accident of.’ Applying this strategy to the new puzzle would consist, then, in 
giving a schooled Aristotelian answer to the question ‘is Polyclitus accidental to the sculptor, or 
the sculptor to Polyclitus?’ along the following lines: in a physical sense, Polyclitus is an accident 
of the sculptor, and in another, metaphysical sense, the sculptor is an accident of Polyclitus; 
but because these senses differ, there is no threat to the asymmetry of a single sense of ‘is an 
accident of.’ Such a distinction would cohere with Aristotle’s numerous detections of ambiguity 
in philosophical terms of art, including his claim that ‘accident’ is polysemous in Metaphysics 5.30. 
Moreover, the fact that this expression has different senses has been used to resolve other puzzles 
of accidentality, suggesting that distinguishing among senses of the term should be the default 
candidate for resolving the new puzzle. 
To be sure, none of what I have said above is incompatible with such a distinction. It might be 
that the results of the previous sections evince another sense of ‘accident,’ a sense pertaining to 
physics more so than metaphysics. But even if the expression enjoys these senses, this fact does 
not explain adequately all of the cases we have seen so far. For consider the case outlined in [T3], 
the house-builder who is accidental to the doctor. One might want to say that the sense in which 
the house-builder is an accident of the doctor is the physical sense. After all, the house-builder is 
not ontologically prior to the doctor, nor is the doctor ontologically prior to the house-builder, so 
one could not be an accident of the other in the metaphysical sense; rather, the reason for one 
being accidental to the other is causal. In particular, the doctor intrinsically efficiently causes 
health, whereas the house-builder does not, which explains why the house-builder is accidental to 
the doctor but the doctor is not accidental to the house-builder. But it is not as if the house-builder 
fails to intrinsically efficiently cause anything, for the house-builder intrinsically efficiently causes 
houses. In the case of the doctor and the house-builder, then, the doctor intrinsically efficiently 
causes something the house-builder fails to cause thusly; but the house-builder too intrinsically 
efficiently causes something the doctor fails to cause thusly. But they cannot both be accidents 
of each other, due to accidentality being asymmetric. And so, the question remains as to whether 
the house-builder is an accident (in the physical sense) of the doctor, or the doctor is an accident 
(in the physical sense) of the house-builder. 
The example of Polyclitus and the sculptor has similar features. Polyclitus is a substance, and 
some substances are, according to Aristotle, intrinsic efficient causes. One well known case of this 
is Aristotle’s claim in Metaphysics 7.7 [1032a25] that man begets man. There, this claim has the 
sense of ‘man is an intrinsic efficient cause of offspring’ because Aristotle offers man’s begetting 
man as case of a natural generation, which he has explicitly contrasted with generation ‘by chance’ 
(ὰ�πὸ�  ταὑ�τομάτου) only a few lines earlier.20 A concrete example of this is Polyclitus’ intrinsically 
efficiently causing Polyclitus the Younger. So the sculptor intrinsically efficiently causes something 
Polyclitus does not, namely the statue; but Polyclitus intrinsically efficiently causes something the 
sculptor does not, namely Polyclitus the Younger. Again, it seems that Polyclitus is an accident 




(in the physical sense) of the sculptor, and the sculptor is an accident (in the physical sense) of 
Polyclitus. But we cannot have it both ways.
In cases like these, settling whether a is an accident of b or b is an accident of a depends on 
more than just the type of entity a and b are and the kind of accidentality at stake. For even if 
we specify that these entities are accidental unities, and that one is an accident of the other in 
the physical sense, the fact that both the doctor and the house-builder are intrinsically efficiently 
causal of something or other leads to running afoul of the asymmetry of accidentality. Nor can 
we divide ‘is an accident (physically) of’ into still further senses, taking Polyclitus to be an accident 
(physically) of the sculptor in one sense, and the sculptor to be an accident (physically) of Polyclitus 
in another sense. At least, we cannot do so for the same reason we distinguished among senses 
of ‘is an accident of.’ For at least in the case of the latter, ‘is an accident of’ applied to different 
types of entity — Polyclitus is a substance, the sculptor an accidental unity — and our initial 
response consisted in the following: when an accidental unity is accidental to a substance, the 
type of accidentality is ontological; and if a substance is accidental to an accidental unity, the 
type is physical. But while this justifies, in part, taking ‘is an accident of’ to be polysemous, it does 
not further support taking ‘is an accident (physically) of’ to have multiple senses. For either the 
conditions on the entities at stake are the same as those just outlined, in which case ‘is an accident 
of (physically)’ has the same sense as ‘is an accident of’; or the conditions on the entities are not 
the same as those just outlined, in which case the initial distinction between being an accident 
(physically) and being an accident (metaphysically) is undermined.
Another way out of the puzzle is to deny that accidentality is asymmetric. If a’s being accidental to 
b is compatible with b’s being accidental to a, then no inconsistency arises from the cases outlined 
in §1. Such a solution would require an alternate reading of [T5] of course, one according to which 
the text shows, at most, that accidentality is non-symmetric. To be sure, one might reasonably 
think that this is all [T5] shows. Normally R is symmetric just in case (if Rxy then Ryx).21 And so, if 
no attribute is accidental to another attribute, there is a substitution instance that satisfies both of 
these conditions, due to the falsehood of the antecedent of the right-hand side.22
Nevertheless, the trivial satisfaction of these conditions due to false antecedents presents 
problems of its own: if the fact that ~Rab and ~Rba, in conjunction with the typical conditions on 
symmetry and asymmetry, jointly entail that R is non-symmetric, then many relations we take to 
be symmetric are non-symmetric, and so are many relations we take to be asymmetric. To take 
only two examples: fatherhood is asymmetric, identity is symmetric. Moreover, we typically do not 
take the facts that no sister is another sister’s father, that Jo is not identical to Robert, and that 
Robert is not identical to Jo to threaten the symmetry and asymmetry of those relations. Ultimately, 
I take what Aristotle is committed to by [T5] — namely, that whenever a is accidental b, there is a 
reason b is not accidental to a — to be more concrete than trivially satisfying symmetry conditions. 
So I continue to characterize his view as one according to which accidentality is asymmetric, even 
if there are post-Aristotelian logical reasons to fashion it as non-symmetric. 
THE RIGHT WAY OUT: CONTEXTUAL ACCIDENTS
The way through is not to divide ‘is an accident (physically) of’ into still further senses, nor to deny 
that accidentality is asymmetric, but to take into account that, in addition to the type of entity a 
and b are and the kind of accidentality at stake, a’s being an accident of b depends on conditions 
that a and b are constituents of. It is not merely that the house-builder is an accident of the 
doctor, perhaps even in the physical sense; rather, the house-builder is an accident of the doctor 
21 See, e.g., Dorr (2004).
22 Additionally, one might find general support for this proposal in Aristotle’s syllogistic: he appreciates that 
particular affirmative statements are logically equivalent to their converses, that if some As are Bs then some Bs 
are As. That is, we find a symmetry in statements that concern the cases from §1: if some humans are white, then 
some white things are humans. Still, this does not by itself show that accidentality is not asymmetric, since as we 
have seen, Aristotle allows for the possibility of true but metaphysically imperspicuous statements. Despite the 
equivalence of some humans being white and some white things being humans, only the latter is an accidental 




relative to the doctor’s intrinsically efficiently causing health. Similarly, we cannot merely say that 
the doctor is an accident of the house-builder, even in the physical sense; rather, the doctor is an 
accident of the house-builder relative to the house-builder’s intrinsically efficiently causing houses. 
Similarly, Polyclitus is an accident of the sculptor relative to his intrinsically efficiently causing 
statues, but the sculptor is accidental to Polyclitus relative to Polyclitus’ intrinsically efficiently 
causing Polyclitus the Younger.
These examples suggest that, for Aristotle, accidentality is contextual. All I mean by this is that 
a’s being an accident of b can vary relative to different contexts or conditions, even though the 
entities and relations involved — a, b, accidentality — remain the same. And this reading dispels 
the lingering doubt. To the question ‘is Polyclitus an accident of the sculptor, or is the sculptor an 
accident of Polyclitus?’, there can be no answer, much as there is no answer to the question ‘is it 
correct to drive on the left side of the road, or the right?’ Neither of these questions can be truly 
and non-trivially answered without having specified a context or condition: ‘the right side’ yields 
a false answer, given that, in England, the left side is correct; ‘the left side’ yields a false answer, 
given that, in America, the right side is correct. (‘The right side or the left side’ is, of course, trivially 
true.) Similarly, in some causal contexts, namely those having to do with intrinsically efficiently 
causing a statue, Polyclitus is an accident of the sculptor; in other causal contexts, those having to 
do with intrinsically efficiently causing a human offspring, the sculptor is an accident of Polyclitus. 
But without such qualifications, the only true answer to the question of whether Polyclitus is an 
accident of the sculptor is the trivial ‘yes, or no.’
Aristotle appeals to just this kind of concept in his discussion of failed refutations in Sophistici 
Elenchi 5. He there says that some disputants, aiming to disprove the hypothesis that a is F, fail to 
do so because they fail to take into consideration the context of the original claim. His examples 
are illustrative:
A refutation involves a contradiction concerning one and the same thing - not a word, 
but an object, and not a synonymous one, but the same word - on the basis of what is 
conceded, by way of necessity, without the point at issue being included, in the same 
respect, in relation to the same thing, in the same way, and at the same time. (The 
same holds for making a false statement about something.) Some people, omitting one 
of the things mentioned, appear to give a refutation, for example, the argument that 
the same thing is the double and not the double. For two is the double of one, but not 
the double of three. Or if the same thing is the double and not the double of the same 
thing, but not in the same respect - double in length, but not double in width. Or if it is 
the double and not the double of the same thing, in the same respect and in the same 
way, but not at the same time; because of that it is an apparent refutation. (Sophistici 
Elenchi 5 [167a23-34]; trans. Hasper.)
The thought here is simple: take two bricks, one of which is twice as wide but half as long as the 
other; and say that Socrates claims that the longer brick is double the shorter brick, relative to 
length.23 Callias might attempt to refute him by pointing out that the longer brick is not double 
the shorter brick, relative to width, but such a refutation is merely apparent, for it omits a context 
or condition related to Socrates’ claim. Socrates does not hold that the brick is double full stop, or 
even that the brick is double relative to width; rather, he says that the brick is double relative to 
length. Of course, if the conditions captured by the clauses ‘relative to length’ and ‘relative to width’ 
made no difference to the truth or falsehood of claims at hand, then the attempted refutation 
would be a real refutation, on the grounds that Socrates’ original claim would be incompatible 
with Callias’ counter-claim. But refutation is not so easily had in this case, because in fact the 
condition or context in which Socrates affirms his original claim makes a difference as to its truth 
or falsehood. In short, Aristotle here deploys the kind of contextualism I use to explain how the 
passages from §1 and §2 fit together.
This kind of contextualism provides a novel solution to the new puzzle. Again, most solution to 
such puzzles rely on detecting ambiguity in ‘is accidental to.’ And while there have been suspicions 




that certain accidents might be contextual in the way I argue for, they are not entertained for long. 
Ferejohn, for instance, suggests that accidentality is contextual, saying, of Aristotle’s discussion of 
snubness in Metaphysics 7.4, that ‘snubness is what Aristotle calls a ‘per se affection’: an attribute 
which cannot be defined without somehow bringing in its proper subject (in this case, nose). […] To 
a modern reader, this might just be seen as a tip-off that ‘snub’ can only be defined contextually 
[…]’ (Ferejohn, 1994: 296; original emphasis). However, Ferejohn takes Aristotle to ‘draw a different 
moral’ from this observation, and does not attribute contextualism to him. Wright similarly takes 
virtue to be contextual, and connects this account to Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean (2010). But 
the case that Wright examines is one where Aristotle describes variation between different sets 
of entities, not variation within the same set of entities; e.g., Aristotle’s holding that F is good 
for a and F is bad for b, not Aristotle’s holding that F is good for a and also bad for a (where such 
attributions require contextualizing). 
Rather, the contextualism I am attributing to Aristotle likely fits best with what Sullivan calls 
explanation-relative accidents. For Sullivan, a property is accidental to its bearer relative to an 
explanatory framework: accidents are properties that do not feature all explanations of some type 
or other; but those same properties might feature in explanations of another type, and relative to 
that explanatory framework, those very same properties are essential, not accidental.24 Similarly, 
Aristotle holds that, sometimes, when a is an accident of b in C, b is an accident of a in another 
context. Indeed, in some of the cases above, when a is an accident of b in some context, that 
relation does not disappear when the context is changed. Rather, the direction of the relation 
changes: when there is a line of accidentality that runs from a to b in an ontological context, there 
is still such a line in a causal context, though the line runs from b to a. For example, with respect to 
ontological priority, Polyclitus is not an accident of the sculptor, the sculptor is instead an accident 
of Polyclitus; but with respect to the sculptor’s intrinsic causal activity, Polyclitus is an accident of 
the sculptor. Moreover, an accidental unity will never be ontologically prior to a substance, so any 
instances akin to the one outlined in [T1], where a substance is accidental to an accidental unity, 
must obtain in causal contexts. But every accidental unity is underlied by some substance, and 
therefore is, in an ontological context, an accident of some substance. So whenever a substance is 
an accident of an accidental unity in a causal context, that very accidental unity is an accident of 
that very substance in an ontological context.
However, there is a point of disanalogy between Aristotle’s contextualism and explanation-
relative accidents. For Sullivan, a property’s belonging to a bearer does not vary with variation 
of explanatory framework. But for Aristotle, it’s possible that in some contexts it’s true that a is 
an accident of b, and in other contexts it’s false that a is an accident of b. E.g., for cases akin to 
what is outlined in [T4], where one accidental unity is accidental to another, it must be that a is 
an accident of b in a causal context. With respect to intrinsically efficiently causing health, the 
house-builder is an accident of the doctor; with respect to intrinsically efficiently causing a house, 
the doctor is an accident of the house-builder; and so on. But there’s no difference in ontological 
priority between the doctor and the house-builder, for both are accidental unities. So with respect 
to ontological priority, it’s false that one is an accident of the other. Sometimes, then, when a is 
an accident of b in C, there’s another context in which neither a is an accident of b, nor b is an 
accident of a.
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